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Abstract: Among the access control methods for database security, there 
is Mandatory Access Control (MAC) model in which the security level is 
set to both the subject and the object to enhance the security control. 
Legacy MAC models have focused only on one thing, either 
confidentiality or integrity. Thus, it can cause collisions between security 
policies in supporting confidentiality and integrity simultaneously. In 
addition, they do not provide a granular security class policy of subjects 
and objects in terms of subjects' roles or tasks. In this paper, we present 
the security policy of Bell_LaPadula Model (BLP) model and Biba model 
as one complemented policy. In addition, Duties Separation and Data 
Coloring (DSDC)-MAC model applying new data coloring security 
method is proposed to enable granular access control from the viewpoint 
of Segregation of Duty (SoD). The case study demonstrated that the 
proposed modeling work maintains the practicality through the design of 
Human Resources management System. The proposed model in this study 
is suitable for organizations like military forces or intelligence agencies 
where confidential information should be carefully handled. Furthermore, 
this model is expected to protect systems against malicious insiders and 
improve the confidentiality and integrity of data. 
 
Keywords: Mandatory Access Control (MAC), SoD-driven Access 
Control, Data Coloring Access Control, Security Key Authorization, 
Complemented BLP and Biba Model 
 
Introduction 
In the Emerging Cyber Threats Report 2015 
published by Georgia Tech, the attack of rogue insiders 
was pointed out as one of emerging cyber threats. 
Security incidents caused by malicious insiders bring 
about significant damage to companies, but solutions are 
not easy at all. To address such evolving threats from 
insiders, it is necessary to develop stronger access 
control technologies to detect anomalous behaviors. Due 
to the dynamics and uncertainty of the current network 
environment, access control is one of the most important 
factors in guaranteeing network information security. 
How to construct a scientific and accurate access control 
model is a current research focus. In actual access 
control mechanisms, users with high trust values bring 
better benefits, but the losses will also be greater once 
cheating access is adopted (Wang et al., 2019). 
Earlier studies on access control can be grouped into 
three categories. First, some studies focus on controlling 
subjects (users, etc.) such as Discretionary Access 
Control (DAC) and Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) 
(Bertino, 2003; Ferraiolo and Kuhn, 1992; Kuhn et al., 
2010; Sandhu et al., 1996; 2000; United Nations, 2004), 
while some are about the expansion of such methods 
(Bertino et al., 2005; Kalinin et al., 2018; Sinha et al., 
2018; Zhao and Chen, 2013) Second, techniques such as 
masking (Mansfield-Devine, 2014), digital watermarking 
(Kumar, 2019), image fusion (Gupta and Kumar, 2019) 
and encryption (Davida et al., 1981; Elovici et al., 2004) 
are aiming at strengthening the security of objects such 
as data. Third, those that consider both subjects and 
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objects include Mandatory Access Control (MAC). 
These methods, however, do not have clear and concrete 
security policies on access control for objects that indeed 
should have been protected primarily. Especially, 
existing MAC models have focused only on one thing, 
either confidentiality or integrity. Thus, it can cause 
collisions between security policies in supporting 
confidentiality and integrity simultaneously. The 
collision problem of security policy between the BLP 
and Biba models is shown in Fig. 5. In addition, since 
access control policies between subjects and objects at 
the same security level have not been subdivided to 
define them specifically, it has been difficult to maintain 
confidentiality and integrity. Even though the Lattice-
Based Access Control (LBAC) model (Sandhu, 1993) 
showed that BLP model (Bell and LaPadula, 1975) and 
Biba model (Biba, 1997) emphasizing only 
confidentiality and integrity can be mathematically 
accommodated in a lattice in terms of information flow, 
but it was not address that the opposite policy between 
their models can be complemented into one security 
policy. In addition, it has not been able to create policies 
for granular security classes of sub-jects and objects in 
terms of subjects' roles or tasks.  
Therefore, the vision or aim of this paper is to solve 
both the collision between security policies of BLP 
model and Biba model in order to guarantee 
confidentiality and integrity at the same time (Fig. 6). To 
do this, we present a complementary policy for BLP 
model and Biba model security policy, but we have 
studied a model that can provide granular access control 
in terms of Separation of Duty (SoD).  
In order to address the ambiguity (collision) issue of 
security access control policies, this study presents a 
DSDC-MAC model that is developed using the principle 
of SoD and a data coloring technique. Based on the 
policies of the suggested model, at the aspect of tasks of 
users and objects are separated (integrity) and such 
classified individual subjects and objects are given 
certain colors according to their security level 
(confidentiality). In turn, the colors are matched with 
security keys (refer Fig. 8 and Fig. 9) to permit subjects 
to access or not to access objects (or data). In addition, 
detailed access control using SoD is enabled for security 
policies between subjects and objects with equivalent 
security level that previous studies have not suggested. 
Moreover, security can be strengthened in terms of 
subject and object mapping through the mechanism of 
granting and assigning access rights using security keys.  
As shown in Fig. 1, according to the proposed 
concepts and principles above, the approach process for 
designing the DSDC-MAC model (Fig. 1) is as follows: 
 
 The security requirements are first redefined 
 The existing BLP and Biba models are compleme-
nted each other 
 The supplemented MAC model (CBB model: 
Complemented BLP and Biba model) by adding 
Separation of Duties policy is refined 
 A security architecture based on the CBB model is 
designed and a detailed access control technique 
using SoD and Data coloring in detail is defined 
 The security keys for matching between subject and 
object are specified to control user’s access to 
objects 
 A case studies and evaluations are discussed 
 
Next Section analyzes the access control models from 
relevant studies. After that, following Section addresses 
the DSDC-MAC model using SoD and data coloring. 
Next Section presents the application case of the 
proposed model for a Human Resources Management 
System (HRMS). Then, next Section compares the 
existing models with the proposed one. 
Relevant Studies 
In this section, the characteristics and limitations 
of the MAC model among various access control 
models that have been studied to explain the direction 
and research purpose of this study are described. 
Next, the differences between the terminology being 
used in this article and the terminology of data 
coloring proposed in the legacy study and separation 
of duties are explained. Finally, the existing research 
methods for DB security are outlined. 
Access Control Model 
MAC is a model to control individual owners of 
objects. The centralized authority determines who should 
be granted access to what kinds of information and 
general users are unable to change access authority. 
Under this principle, MAC models (Kalinin et al., 2018), 
which determine access control rules by centralized 
security rules, guarantee data confidentiality and 
integrity that are not maintained in DAC systems that 
Owner decides on access control rules. However, it is 
difficult to determine security levels suitable for subjects 
and objects in advance and also not easy to apply. 
Among the MAC-based models, BLP model, Biba 
models and LBAC models are representative. 
Focusing on confidentiality, the BLP prevents 
information from flowing from a higher security level 
to a lower security level. As shown in Fig. 2, the BLP 
model has two policies (No-read-up Policy and No-
write-down Policy). 
The BLP model allows high security subjects to 
read, but not write, objects of the same or lower level. 
Conversely, a low secure subject can write, but cannot 
read, objects of the same or higher level. In other 
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words, although the confidentiality is emphasized so 
that a low security subject can’t steal high-level data, 
it has a problem in terms of integrity that a low 
security subject can manipulate high-level documents. 
On the contrary, as shown in Fig. 3, the Biba model 
(Biba, 1997) focusing on integrity is based on the 
security access class of subjects and objects. If a subject 
at a lower security is allowed to alter objects at higher 
security levels, the original reliability of data can be 
compromised as it is combined with less reliable 
information. The Biba model has No-read-down and No-
write-up Integrity Policies. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1: Approach process for designing the DSDC-MAC model 
 
 
 
Fig. 2: Security policy of BLP model 
Solution success policy 
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Fig. 3: Security policy of Biba model 
 
The Biba model has a policy opposite to BLP model 
in Fig. 2. That is, a high security subject can use the 
same or lower class objects but cannot read them. 
Conversely, a low secure subject can read an equivalent 
or higher level object, but cannot write. In other words, 
it emphasizes integrity so that subjects with low 
security level cannot manipulate high-level documents, 
but rather, it is a model that has a problem in 
confidentiality that a low-security subject can steal 
high-level documents. 
The LBAC model (Sandhu, 1993; Denning, 1976) is 
one of the most common models among the MAC 
models. To specify the multi-layer security policy, the 
dominate relation between the security levels and use 
lattice to specify the order is defined. In front, we 
mentioned the limitations of the security policy of BLP 
model and Biba model emphasizing only confidentiality 
and integrity respectively. Although it has been shown 
through several examples that each model can be 
mathematically accommodated within a lattice in terms 
of information flow, but it is not clear that the opposite 
of two models can be complemented into one policy. 
Separation of Duties (SoD) 
Headings SoD (Botha and Eloff, 2001) is a method 
for internal control associated with the execution of 
tasks. One task is divided into several duties and the 
duties are executed by multiple people to complete the 
task. This is designed to prevent any abuse of 
authority or mistakes that may occur in business 
processes. This concept (Botha and Eloff, 2001;  
Moon et al., 2004) started as a design principle for 
data protection in conventional computer systems and 
it has been defined as a requirement for various access 
control models including RBAC model. SoD was 
defined as separation of privilege in Saltzer and 
Schroeder (1975) among 8 design principles for the 
protection of information systems and it was also 
defined as a mechanism to guarantee the integrity of 
data by linking objects in systems to systems in the real 
world in Clark and Wilson (1987). 
SoD literally means “separating authority” from a 
perspective of “subjects.” To execute a task, its authority 
is separated and multiple people cooperate together 
doing their duties. From a perspective of data (objects), 
however, it is required to classify the objects into small-
scale tasks to apply the SoD principle to them. This 
study suggests more segmented access control methods 
to secure integrity by classifying tasks classification 
criteria of objects into more segmented and small-scale 
data to apply SoD. 
Data Coloring 
The word, data coloring (Ceze et al., 2008), was first 
introduced as a technique to apply to programming 
models. Programmers select certain points and assign 
colors to them in a control flow in which the consistency 
of data needs to be secured. This was proposed as a 
programming model to control access simultaneously 
through data coloring. A new data coloring technique in 
Hwang and Li (2010) was suggested as a color matching 
technique to identify data and users. For the new 
technique, watermarking mechanism and fuzzy logic were 
used for cloud computing environments. In Liu et al. 
(2011), the data coloring technique suggested in    
Hwang and Li (2010) was applied as a cloud water-
marking model and presented test results. In Sudha and 
Jamuna (2013), a cloud watermarking model using 
secure RSA algorithm was suggested as a regular 
authorization method. In other words, data coloring 
models that were presented in Hwang and Li (2010),   
Liu et al. (2011) and Sudha and Jamuna (2013) used 
software watermarking technology to allow the 1:1 
access control between Subject (S) and Object (O) when 
sensitive data had to be shared in cloud environments.  
Given that, earlier data coloring techniques are not 
suitable to classify levels of confidentiality as well as 
hierarchical authority levels of subjects and objects in 
this study. 
Upper security level 
Read 
Read 
Upper level of subject 
Lower security level 
Biba no-write-up policy 
simple security property 
Read 
Upper security level 
Write 
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Write 
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Fig. 4: Legacy methods of DB security 
 
Legacy Methods of DB Security 
As shown in Fig. 4, earlier studies on the security of 
Database (DB) can be grouped into Subject-Oriented 
Methods (SOMs), Object-Oriented Methods (OOMs) 
and Multilevel Security (MLS) methods that combined 
the two types. 
SoD and Data Coloring based MAC Model: 
DSDC-MAC 
In order to address collision issues between policies 
found in MAC models such as BLP and Biba, techniques 
of Separation of Duties and data coloring are used in this 
study. Through this method, this study aims to suggest a 
DSDC-MAC model that can provide more segmented 
access controls to users (subjects) and data (objects). In 
doing so, security keys are used as an authorization 
means for subjects and objects. To do this, this section 
defines the access control policies of MAC models and 
proposes security architecture of DSDC-MAC model 
and finally specifies access control technique based on 
SoD and data coloring. 
Complemented Policy Model for Solving Policy 
Collision: CBB 
Security Policy Collision between the BLP and 
Biba Models 
The BLP model, one of the most representative 
MAC models, focuses on confidentiality, while the 
Biba model puts focus on securing integrity. If 
confidentiality and integrity need to be guaranteed 
simultaneously, all of the policies of the two models 
should be satisfied at the same time. In this case, as 
shown in Fig. 5, collisions between the access control 
policies of the two models occur inevitably. 
The No-read-up Policy of the BLP model protects the 
confidentiality of higher-level secrets by preventing 
lower security levels from reading higher-level secrets. 
On the other hand, the Biba model prevents users at 
higher security levels from reading objects at lower 
security levels. General concepts of these access control 
policies are to prevent anything that are clearly not 
allowed and to allow anything that are clearly not 
prevented. Based on these concepts, the No-read-up 
Policy of the BLP model potentially means “possible-
read-sibling and down.” In other words, this means that 
reading objects at the same level or lower levels is 
allowed. Therefore, this exactly collides with the No-
read-down Policy of the Biba model. In addition, the No-
write-down Policy of the BLP model potentially means 
“possible-write-sibling and up.” Again, this means that 
writing objects at the same level or higher levels is al-
lowed. Therefore, this exactly collides with the No-
write-up Policy of the Biba model.  
Collisions between the policies of the BLP and the 
Biba models occur in the following cases.  
Case 1. BLP Model "No-Read-Up" Policy ⇔ Biba 
Model "No-Read-Down" Policy 
For instance, if there are some personnel who have the 
2nd grade (Secret) authority in an organization, according 
to the BLP model policy, they can read the 2nd grade 
(Secret) and the 3rd grade (Confidential) information, but 
they are not allowed to read the 1st grade (Top Secret) 
information. According to the Biba model, however, the 
personnel can read the 2nd grade (Secret) and 1st grade 
(Top Secret) information, but they are not allowed to read 
the 3rd grade (Confidential) information. In this case, a 
Subject Access control Object 
User 
 
Administrators 
application 
Resources 
 
Data 
File 
. 
. 
. 
 
Authentication 
Authorization 
Security level: 
LabelRules 
Masking 
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question emerges like whether the personnel who have the 
2nd grade (Secret) authority should be allowed to read 
Top Secrets in the Biba model and this arises from 
“confidentiality.” In other words, there is a contradiction 
in the “No-read-down” Policy of the Biba model from the 
perspective of confidentiality. 
Case 2. BLP Model "No-Write-Down" Policy ⇔ 
Biba Model "No-Write-Up" Policy 
Like Case 1, if there are some personnel who have 
the 2nd grade (Secret) authority, according to the BLP 
model policy, they can write the 2nd grade and the 1st 
grade information, but they are not allowed to write 
the 3rd grade information. According to the Biba 
model, however, the personnel who have the 2nd 
grade authority can write the 2nd grade and 3rd grade 
information, but they are not allowed to write the 1st 
grade information. Again, a question emerges like 
whether the personnel who have the 2nd grade 
(Secret) authority should be allowed to write Top 
Secrets in the Biba model and this arises from 
“integrity.” In other words, there is a contradiction in 
the “No-write-down” Policy of the BLP model from 
the perspective of integrity. 
Requirements and Assumptions of Security Policy 
 In order to address such collision issues between 
policies of the BLP and Biba models and to guarantee 
both confidentiality and integrity, requirements for 
security policies should be defined as follows:  
 
 Req. 1. Subjects who have higher-level authority can 
access objects at the same lev el and lower levels 
 Req. 2. Subjects who have lower-level authority 
should not be allowed to access higher-level objects 
 Req. 3. Subjects should be prevented from accessing 
secretes unrelated to their task 
 
This means that in a relationship between a subject 
and object at the same level, a subject should be 
prevented from discretionarily accessing an object out of 
its task range. Even subjects who have higher-level 
authority should be also prevented from discretionarily 
accessing objects at lower levels out of their task range.  
Assumptions for security to meet these requirements 
are as follows:  
 
 Ass. 1. If a subject is allowed to read an object at a 
higher level than its security level, confidentiality is 
violated 
 Ass. 2. If a subject is allowed to write an object at a 
higher level than its security level, integrity is 
violated 
 Ass. 3. In an ordinary organization, users are not 
allowed to handle secret information unrelated to 
their task 
 Ass. 4. In an ordinary organization, a subject who 
has higher-level authority assumes all the authority 
of subjects at lower levels 
 
Complementary BLP and Biba Policy Model: CBB 
Policy Model 
To meet the requirements discussed in above 
section, access control policies based on the MAC 
model are redefined as follows. In particular, the 
security policy rule for Req. 3 should be derived from 
the perspective of SoD, one of the basic principles for 
information security. 
Rule 1: (No-Read/Write-Up Policy, * Simple Security 
Property) [Derived from Req. 1 and 2] 
A subject who has lower-level authority is prevented 
from accessing objects at higher levels. A subject who 
has higher-level authority can access objects at the same 
level or lower levels. Allowing subjects at lower levels 
to read objects at higher levels raises confidentiality 
issues. In addition, allowing subjects at lower levels to 
write objects at higher levels violates integrity. This 
policy protects both confidentiality and integrity by 
preventing subjects who do not have access authority 
from accessing objects. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5: Security policy collision between the BLP and Biba models 
BLP model Biba model 
No-read-up policy No-write-up policy 
No-read-down policy No-write-down policy 
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Fig. 6: Enhanced CBB policy model for solving policy collision between BLP and Biba model 
 
Rule 2: (No-Read/Write-Sibling Policy, * Separation of 
Duties Property) [Derived from Req. 3] 
“Sibling” is a word for “brother or sister” or “those 
having parents in common.” In this study, siblings mean 
subjects and objects at the same security level and their 
tasks are classified based on the Rule 1. A subject at a 
certain level can access objects allowed within the same 
task category. It cannot access objects at higher levels 
even within the same task category as defined in Req. 1, 
but it can access objects at lower levels.  
An enhanced CBB policy model for access control is 
shown in Fig. 6. This is based on the BLP and Biba 
models and coupled with SoD, this model can maintain 
confidentiality and integrity. This model combines the 
priority policy for confidentiality in the BLP model and 
that for integrity in the Biba model. By doing so, it is 
possible to exclude policies that cause collisions between 
the two models and to map the priority policies with the 
policies derived from the SoD principle. In other words, 
in terms of confidentiality, it prevents unauthorized 
subjects from accessing higher level objects for “read” 
and in terms of integrity, it prevents unauthorized 
subjects from accessing higher level objects for “write”. 
That is why it drives to provide and improve the 
confidentiality and integrity and at the same time. In 
particular, at the same level, access is granted by 
classifying subjects and objects in detail by separation of 
duties. Thus, even at the same level, access to “read” and 
“write” can be denied without permission, further 
enhancing confidentiality and integrity. 
As discussed in Cases 1 and 2, contradictions in 
terms of confidentiality and integrity are found in the 
existing BLP and Biba models. The CBB policy model 
suggested in this study addresses such issues and the 
explanation for the solutions is as follows: 
[Contradiction]  
 Cont. 1. The “No-read-down” Policy of the Biba 
model has a contradiction in terms of confidentiality 
 Cont. 2. The “No-write-down" Policy of the BLP 
model has a contradiction in terms of integrity 
 Cont. 3. Each policy of the BLP and Biba model has 
a contradiction in terms of both confidentiality and 
integrity between subjects and objects within the 
same level 
 
[Explanation] 
Confidentiality is a feature to prevent subjects, who 
have no authority or have lower-level authority, from 
accessing data to be protected. The “No-read-down” 
Policy of the Biba model in Cont. 1 means “Possible-
read-up" and gives subjects at lower levels authority to 
read objects at higher levels. Therefore, Cont. 1 violates 
confidentiality.  
Integrity is a feature to prevent subjects, who have 
no authority or have lower-level authority, from 
accessing and altering data to be protected. The “No-
write-down" Policy of the BLP model in Cont. 2 means 
"Possible-write-up" and gives subjects at certain levels 
authority to write objects at higher levels. Therefore, 
Cont. 2 violates integrity.  
In Cont. 3, the “No-read-down” Policy of the Biba 
model means “Possible-read-sibling.” The “No-write-
down” Policy of the BLP model means “Possible-write-
sibling.” Therefore, a subject at a certain level cannot be 
classified by tasks. In other words, Cont. 3 violates both 
confidentiality and integrity since access authority for 
reading and writing is allowed to multiple objects at the 
same level. By separating duties for subjects and object 
at the same level, access can be controlled. 
BLP model Biba model 
No-read-up policy No-write-up policy 
No-write-down policy No-read-down policy 
Confidentiality-up Integrity-up 
Confidentiality and Integrity-up 
Separation of duties 
No-read/write-sibiling policy 
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The CBB Policy model, under the ”No-read/write-
up" rule, does not allow subjects at certain levels to 
access (read/write) objects at higher levels at all. In 
addition, by separating duties for subjects and object at 
the same level, access can be controlled. Therefore, the 
suggested policy addresses contradictions that the 
existing models have. 
[Formal Definition]  
The formal definition of the CBB policy to 
accommodate Rule1 and Rule2 derived above is as follows: 
When and only when the security level SL(S) of a 
subject 'S' dominates or equal to the security level 
SL(S) of an object 'O' and the duty (task and/or 
sub_task) of a subject 'S' equal to the task of an object 
'O', the subject 'S' has the “read/write/append/delete” 
access to the object 'O'. 
Security Level (SL) consists of Upper Security Level 
(USL), Lower Security Level (LSL) and Sib-ling 
Security Level (SSL) and can have 1 to n security levels: 
 
   , ,   1, 2,  SL USL LSL SSL and SL SL SLn      (1) 
 
The level or degree of access permission defines as 
Security Level Function: f(x), The USL function: fu, the 
LSL function: fl and the SSL function: fs. The access 
permission level is defined as follows: 
 
      /  fux S fsx O and or flx O   (2) 
 
   fly S fuy O   (3) 
 
Where: 
“⇒” means “access permitted”,  
“  ” means “access denied” 
 
* Rule description: The security level of a specific 
subject (S) means that only an object (O) at an equal 
level and lower level can be accessed (2) but the object 
can't access to higher level (3).  
When a subject (S) having a specific task is defined 
as a Subject in a certain task: St and an object (O) 
corresponding to a specific task is defined as an Object 
in certain task: Ot, the access permission of the security 
level to the object of the specific task by the subject of 
the specific task is defined as follows: 
 
      /  fux Stn fsx Otn and or flx Otn   (4) 
 
   fly Stn fuy Otn   (5) 
 
      /  fuy Stn fsy Otm and or fly Otm  (6) 
* Rule description: A specific upper level subject (S) 
having a specific task (tn) is accessible to an equal level 
and a lower level object (O) of a specific job (4). 
However, the lower level subject (S) having the specific 
task (tn) is that the access is limited to upper level object 
(5) and if the task is different even if it is a higher level, 
it means that it is not possible to access to object of the 
same and lower level (6). 
Duties Separation and Data Coloring based MAC 
Model: DSDC-MAC 
As shown in Fig. 7, the security structure of the 
Duties Separation and Data Coloring (DSDC)-MAC 
model is mainly composed of security level policy; 
separation of duties policy; data coloring rules and the 
relationship among subject, security key and object are 
applied to. For strict authorization, access has to go 
through the first authorization process based on Id 
(identification) and Password and the second 
authorization process based on security key to directly 
apply access control policies and additionally certify 
access. Security Key (SK) serve as a medium to link 
between a subject and an object. In the processes of 
security key authority and delegation policy, the 
security keys of individual subjects are authorized and 
assigned and users at the relevant security level can 
delegate security keys to others. Simple security 
property and separation of duties property, as 
complementary BLP and Biba model (CBB) policies, 
address collision issues between policies that were 
found in earlier studies in terms of confidentiality and 
integrity. They are also reflected in access control 
policies to ensure a subject can access an object while 
maintaining confidentiality and integrity. 
Security Level Policy 
Security levels of subjects and objects are 
determined based on those of the existing MAC 
models. Considering the military domain, they are 
classified as Top secret, Secret, Confidential and 
Unclassified (Ferraiolo and Kuhn, 1992; Sandhu et al., 
1996). Persons in charge of each of the four security 
levels are described in Table 1. Objects can be files, 
data, etc., but data is mainly targeted for the 
consistency of expression here. 
Separation of Duties Policy 
To secure effective internal control and maintain 
confidentiality at each task level, tasks need to be 
separated according to security levels, but it is also 
necessary to segment access control based on the 
separated tasks. A subject’s access authority to objects is 
set by tasks based on the SoD policy. A subject, here, 
means a user who uses an object (for instance, data). 
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Fig. 7: Duties separation and data coloring-based MAC model for solving policy collision: DSDC-MAC 
 
Table 1: Security level categories and persons in charge of 
objects 
Security level Person in charge of object 
Top Secret Top-Level Administrators in the 
 organization 
Secret Middle Managers in the organization 
Confidential General Office Workers in the 
 organization 
Unclassified All Persons in the organization 
 (Non-Authorized Secret Handling) 
 
Table 2: A 2-level task categorization scheme according to 
SoD policy and an example  
Super category Sub category 
(a) categorization scheme 
Task #1 subTask #1_1 
Task #2 subTask #1_2 
Task #3 : 
Task #4 subTask #2_1 
: : 
Task #n subTask #n_m 
(b) Categorization example 
Affairs Administration, affairs plans 
Intelligence Security, intelligence analysis 
Operations Ops plans, current ops, future ops 
Logistics Logistics plans, supply, maintenance, 
 transportation 
ICT ICT plans, operations, information security 
Tasks need to be grouped into, first, super-categories 
by their functions and, second, sub-categories within the 
same super-category. Depending on the size and 
characteristic of an organization, super-categories are 
needed only in some cases and for large-sized 
organizations, it will be necessary to segment tasks 
further beyond the second-level sub-categories. If 
necessary, more tasks can be added to sub-categories. Of 
course, the more category levels are created, the more 
difficulties the system faces. Table 2 shows the structure 
of task categories and examples for the military domain.  
Data Coloring Policy 
To Data coloring is a concept that was first 
developed to add identifiers to the confidentiality levels 
of data. Colors are assigned to data to allow users to 
intuitively recognize the confidentiality levels of data. 
It is possible to distinguish the levels simply by using 
arrays of numbers or levels as identifiers, but there is 
still ambiguity over how the criteria of identifiers 
should be set to distinguish confidentiality levels. 
However, it is possible to conveniently set criteria for 
confidentiality levels by applying the RGB coloring 
classification scheme suggested in this study. It is also 
possible to designate more segmented identifiers within 
each of the R, G and B groups. 
User Data 
+id: string 
+password: string 
+securitykey: string 
+securityLevel: integer 
<<First-certification>> 
Certi_Id-Password 
+requestIdCheck() 
+filename: string 
<<Security-certification>> 
Certi_SecurityKey 
securitykey_Delegation-Policy 
securitykey_Authorization-Policy 
+requestSecurityKeyCheck() 
Subject Object 
Securyty_Key 
+permit(id, securitykey) 
+deny() 
Security_Level_Policy 
Access_Control_List Access_Control_Policy 
<<CBB Policy Model>> 
+simpleSecurityProperty 
+seperationOfDutiesProperty 
 
+controltAccessToObjectHavingConfidentialityIntegrity() 
- Support 
confidentiality and 
integrity 
- Solution of 
policy collision 
Access_Control_Matrix Data_Coloring_Policy Separation_of_Duties_Policy 
+No-read/write-sibling_Policy() 
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Red, Green and Blue (RGB) colors are expressed as 
hexadecimal codes on a web page. Color values are 
specified as three pairs of two-digit hexadecimal values 
representing red, green and blue. When creating web-
based colors, such hexadecimal notations are used and 
they start with a special symbol (#). The structure of 
color notations is shown in Table 3.  
Around 16 million colors can be created through the 
256 levels of RGB combinations. This can be utilized as 
a very systematic classification method using the web-
based color notations above.  
Table 4 shows security colors that are defined by 
wrapping the security levels of data (Table 1) with RGB 
colors. For instance, “red” color is assigned to “top 
secret” data, creating a security color, “SC_R” 
(SecurityColor_Red). General data categorized as 
“unclassified” are actually not the target objects of 
protection and thus they are excluded here and even from 
security keys later. Based on Table 1, security colors in 
Table 4 represent security levels of subjects and objects. 
DSDC Access Control Technique based on SoD 
and Data Coloring 
Subjects and Objects Matching by using Color and 
Task (Duties) 
To provide segmented access controls, color codes are 
given to objects and subjects. Access can be controlled 
through the mechanism of matching the same color codes. 
In other words, individual security colors of subjects and 
objects (Table 4) are further segmented into color values 
by separating tasks (super- and sub-category tasks). Their 
color values are defined (Table 3) and individual 
identifiers of access authority are given as shown in Table 
5. With these color codes, it is possible to easily identify 
security levels and tasks of subjects and objects and their 
access authority can be segmented by tasks. Codes shaded 
in gray are highlighted for convenience to intuitively 
recognize the colors of classified identifiers and thus they 
have nothing to do with the titles of identifiers. The color 
codes by tasks in Table 5 are generated based on the 
Rules 3 and 4 and the rule in Table 6.  
Security colors are given to each security level and 
task and the rules for identification are as shown in Rules 
3 and 4. The color values of security levels and tasks are 
as follows:  
 
SC_R: #FF0000, SC_G: #00FF00, SC_B: #0000FF 
 
Rule 3: (Assigning RGB Basic Color Codes to 
Individual Security Levels) 
Web-based colors are identified by the location of 
“FF” within 6-digit color codes and security levels are 
basically classified based on this. If “FF” comes in the 
1st and 2nd digits, this means red; in the 3rd and 4th 
digits, green; and in the 5th and 6th digits, blue.  
Rule 4: (Assigning Detailed Color Codes to Category 
Levels of Each Task) 
The first two digits “nn” within color codes 
(excluding FF) are identifiers for super-category tasks 
and the second two digits “mm” are those for sub-
category tasks. With these segmented task identifiers, 
access can be controlled specifically.  
Examples to assign color codes based on Rule 4 are 
as shown in Table 6. 
Subjects Subject-Object Matching by Using 
Security Keys 
Process of Subject-Object Matching 
Figure 8 shows the matching process of color codes 
assigned to subjects and objects. Through the 
ID/Password authorization of users, their pre-
authorized security level and SoD category (task) are 
identified. Objects are data that belong to higher and 
lower tasks stored within the database table and 
schema. Tasks can be matched with subjects through 
keys or attributes that have color code values. Security 
keys between subjects and objects are tools to verify 
the security levels and SoD that were pre-authorized 
and assigned to subjects. When an authorized subject 
wants to authorize additional security keys, authority is 
granted to the user to access objects matched with the 
authorized security levels and duties. 
Definition of Security Key 
As shown in Fig. 9, security key is an essential 
medium that links subjects and objects at certain 
security levels based on proper rules (formulas 7~21 
below). This serves as a dual-lock tool for the 
additional authorization of users along with the 
ID/PW method. In other words, security key is a 
means to ensure users access objects (data) allowed to 
them according to their security levels. This can be 
realized using methods like One Time Password 
(OTP). In order to provide security policies on access 
control using security keys, those keys should be 
matched with colors of security levels in Table 5 and 
by doing so, access of subjects (users) to objects 
(data) can be controlled. Based on the rules to control 
access authority (formulas 17~21), certain access 
authority is granted to users when the security colors of 
their security keys are the same as or higher than their 
level within the same task category. 
Subject-Object Matching by Using Security Key 
Table 7 shows how subject, security key and object 
can be matched by security levels using data coloring. 
Here, the security levels of the keys are defined using a 
data coloring technique and the abbreviation of 
‘SK_(color of a certain level)’ is used for security key. 
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Fig. 8: Process of subject and object matching 
 
 
 
Fig. 9: Relationship among subject, security key and object 
 
Table 3: Web-based RGB color notation 
Special symbol Red channel Green channel Blue channel 
# 00 ~ FF 00 ~ FF 00 ~ FF 
 
Table 4: Security colors policy defined by wrapping security levels with colors 
Security level Color Security color 
Top secret Red SC_R(Red) 
Secret Green SC_G(Green) 
Confidential Blue SC_B(Blue) 
Unclassified Black - 
 
Table 5: Detailed security levels and color relation 
SoD-applied security level Color code of super category task Color code of sub-category task  
SC_R_t #1: #FFAA00 #1_1: #FFAA11 
 #2: #FFBB00 #1_2: #FFAA22 
 #3: #FFCC00 : 
 #4: #FFDD00 #2_1: #FFBB11 
 #5: #FFEE00 : 
 : #3_1: #FFCC11 
SC_G_t #1: #AAFF00 #1_1: #AAFF11 
 #2: #BBFF00 #1_2: #AAFF22 
 #3: #CCFF00 : 
 #4: #DDFF00 #2_1: #BBFF11 
 #5: #EEFF00 : 
 : #3_1: #CCFF11 
SC_B_t #1: #AA00FF #1_1: #AA11FF 
 #2: #BB00FF #1_2: #AA22FF 
 #3: #CC00FF : 
 #4: #DD00FF #2_1: #BB11FF 
 #5: #EE00FF : 
 : #3_1: #CC11FF 
[Legend] t: Task category 
Matching 
SC of subjects (users) SC of objects (data) 
Security 
keys labled 
SC 
1 1 1 1 
Matching 
Pre-approved 
security level and 
SoD category(task) 
Authentication 
value of security 
color and task 
Key of attribute 
*Has the security 
color value 
Security color and task =# color code 
# Color code # Color code # Color code # Color code 
ID/password 
authentication 
Security key 
authentication 
Task 
Data Super-category 
sub-category 
*Has the information of 
authorized/assigned security key 
*Has the information of authorized 
security color and key Table and schema of database 
Subject Security key Object 
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Table 6: Rules and examples of super- and sub-category color codes of each task 
① Color code example of super-category ② Color code example of sub-category 
SC_R_tn : #FFnn00 SC_R_tn_m : #FFnnmm 
SC_G_tn : #nnFF00 SC_G_tn_m : #nnFFmm 
SC_B_tn : #nn00FF SC_B_tn_m : #nnmmFF 
SC_R_t1 : #FFAA00 SC_R_t1_1 : #FFAA11 
SC_G_t1 : #AAFF00 SC_G_t1_1 : #AAFF11 
SC_B_t1 : #AA00FF SC_B_t1_1 : #AA11FF 
* n, m: Integer (1~n,m), n, m: hexadecimal (0~E/excluding 'F') 
** Excluding 'F' in hexadecimal values is to avoid collision with the color level identifier, "FF". 
 
Table 7: Matching among subject, security key and object using data coloring 
Subject SC_level of subject Security_Key SC_level of object Object 
Top_level administrator SC_R SK_R SC_R Top secret data 
Middle manager SC_G SK_G SC_G Secret data 
General office worker SC_B SK_B SC_B Confidential data 
 
Table 8: Matching among subject, security key and object using SoD and data coloring 
Subject SC_level of subject Security_Key  SC_level of object Object 
Top_level administrator SC_R_t SK_R_t SC_R_t Top secret data 
Middle manager SC_G_t SK_G_t SC_G_t Secret data 
General office worker SC_B_t SK_B_t SC_B_t Confidential data 
 
The relationship among security color, security key 
and subject (user) is as follows: 
 
 , ,
* , ,
R G B
R G B
SC SC SC SC
SC SC SC

  SC_ GSCR _ SC_B
  (7) 
 
 , ,
* , ,
R G B
R G B
SK SK SK SK
SK SK SK

  SK_ GSKR _ SK_B
 (8) 
 
 
1 1 1
, , :
l m n
Ri Gj Bk
i j k
SK SK SK SK l m n Positive integer
  
  
    
  
 (9) 
 
1 1
n n
i j
i j
SK User
 
  (10)  
 
Subject, object (Table 5) and security key (Table 7) 
are classified with colors respectively and identified with 
color codes. 'L, m, n' in Formula 9 is determined by the 
number of subjects in each security level. Table 8 shows 
the mutual matching mechanism among subject, security 
key and object with tasks (SoD) added to Table 7. 
SoD and data coloring are added to formulas (7), (8), 
(9) and (10) on security level above and the relationship 
among security color, security key and user can be 
defined as follows: 
 
 , ,
* , ,
RT GT BT
RT GT BT
SC SC SC SC
SC SC SC

  RSC_ SC_ SC_ G_t t _B_t
  (11) 
 
 , ,
* , ,
RT GT BT
RT GT BT
SK SK SK SK
SK SK SK

  RSK_ SK_ SK_ G_t t _B_t
  (12) 
 
1 1 1
, , :
l m n
RTi GTj BTk
i j k
SK SK SK SK l m n Positive integer
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  
    
  
 (13) 
 
1
n
R RTi
i
SK SK

    (14)  
 
1
n
G GTi
i
SK SK

   (15)  
 
1
n
B BTi
i
SK SK

   (16) 
 
Authority-Based Access Control 
Authority-Based Policy Definition 
For further segmented access controls, the access 
authority of subjects, of which tasks are separated by 
security levels, to objects should have more detailed 
rules for access based on the security policy of Rules 1 
and 2 as follows. Depending on the characteristics of 
organizations, their tasks may need to have only one-
level classification (super-category only). In this case, 
access authority can be assigned based on Rule 5. If the 
tasks need to be classified into two-level categories 
(supper- and sub-category), Rule 6 can be applied. Rule 
7 is applied to assign or delegate access authority within 
the same task level. 
Rule 5: Assigning Access Authority to Super-Category 
Tasks 
 
S: SC_tn ⇒ O: ≚ SC_tn{p}  (17) 
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* Description: A subject that is classified to a certain 
security level and super-category and certified as SC_tn 
is given (⇒) access authority{permission} to objects 
below (≚) its relevant security level within its super-
category task.  
 
* Policy specifications under Rule 5 
S: SC_R_tn ⇒ O: SC_R_tn{e, r, a, w}, O: SC_G_tn{e, r, 
a, w}, O: SC_B_tn{e, r, a, w} 
S: SC_G_tn ⇒ O: SC_G_tn{e, r, a, w}, O: SC_B_tn{e, r, 
a, w} 
S: SC_B_tn ⇒ O: SC_B_tn{e, r, a, w} 
S: ∧SC ⇒ O: SC_K{e, r, a, w} 
 * S = Subject, O = Object, p = policy 
 K = Black Color (meaning Unclassified level), 
 e = executing, r = reading, a = appending, w = 
writing 
 
Rule 6: Assigning access authority to the sub-category 
tasks  
 
S: SC_tn_m ⇒ O: ≚SC_tn_m{p} (18) 
 
* Description: A subject that is classified to a certain 
security level and sub-category task and certified as 
SC_tn_m is given access authority to objects below its 
relevant security level within its sub-category task. 
 
* Policy specifications under Rule 6  
S: SC_R_tn_m ⇒O: SC_R_tn_m{e, r, a, w}, O: 
SC_G_tn_m{e, r, a, w}, O: SC_B_tn_m{e, r, a, w} 
S: SC_G_tn_m ⇒O: SC_G_tn_m{e, r, a, w}, O: 
SC_B_tn_m{e, r, a, w} 
S: SC_B_tn_m ⇒O: SC_B_tn_m{e, r, a, w} 
 
Rule 7: Assigning and delegating access authority 
within the same security level  
 
: _ : _S SC tn O SC tm  (19) 
 
S: SC_tn+m ⇒ O: ≚SC_tm{p} (20) 
 
* Description: A subject that is classified to a 
certain task authority level of a certain security level 
and certified as SC_tn is not allowed to access objects at 
the same security level in other tasks. Only when 
access authority to other tasks is additionally delegated 
to it, to put it another way, when a subject certified as 
SC_tn+m is additionally given a delegated access 
authority (tm) other than its original task (tn), the 
subject is allowed to access objects below the security 
level of tm within the task category. 
 
* Policy specifications under Rule 7 
S: SC_R_tn  O: SC_R_tm{e, r, a, w},  
 O: SC_G_tm{e, r, a, w}, O: SC_B_tm{e, r, a, w} 
S: SC_R_tn+m ⇒O: SC_R_tn{e, r, a, w},  
 O: SC_G_tn{e, r, a, w}, O: SC_B_tn{e, r, a, w},  
 O: SC_R_tm{e, r, a, w}, O: SC_G_tm{e, r, a, w}, 
 O: SC_B_tm{e, r, a, w} 
 
S: SC_G_tn  O: SC_G_tm{e, r, a, w},  
 O: SC_B_tm{e, r, a, w} 
S: SC_G_tn+m ⇒ O: SC_G_tn{e, r, a, w},  
 O: SC_B_tn{e, r, a, w}, O: SC_G_tm{e, r, a, w},  
 O: SC_B_tm{e, r, a, w} 
 
S: SC_B_tn  O: SC_B_tm{e, r, a, w} 
S: SC_B_tn+m ⇒ O: SC_B_tn{e, r, a, w},  
 O: SC_B_tm{e, r, a, w} 
 
Rule 8: Assigning and delegating access authority 
according to a super and sub-category tasks 
within the same security level (Optional rule) 
 
   : _ : _ _ , 1 ~ ,  S SC tn O SC tn i p i m where n m     (21)  
 
* Description: A subject that is classified to a super-
category of a certain security level and certified as SC_tn 
is given access authority to objects that are classified as 
sub-category tasks under the super-category task at the 
security level. However, this rule can be applied when 
there is a need to restrict access to specific subordinate 
functions to those who have authority of specific higher 
level tasks according to the confidential classification 
policy of the organization. 
 
* Policy specifications under Rule 8 
S: SC_R_tn ⇒ O: SC_R_tn_i {e, r, a, w}, {i = 1~m, 
where n ≠ m} 
S: SC_G_tn ⇒ O: SC_G_tn_i {e, r, a, w}, {i = 1~m, 
where n ≠ m} 
S: SC_B_tn ⇒ O: SC_B_tn_i {e, r, a, w}, {i = 1~m, 
where n ≠ m} 
 
Authority-based Access Control  
The relationship among subject, security key and 
object classified under the SoD principle and security 
levels is shown in Fig. 10. The figure also shows 
examples of access attempts that are not allowed under 
their respective access authority. Access attempts ②, ③ 
and ④ (except ①) are blocked under Rules 1-2 and 5-6. 
In the case of attempt ①, a subject at the Secret level 
within Task #2 accesses an object within the same task 
category with a valid security key. Attempts ②, ③ and 
④, however, try to reach objects out of their task 
categories and thus their access is blocked under the 
access control policy.  
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Fig. 10: Categories of and relationship between subject, security key and object 
 
However, Attempts ② and ③ are to access 
objects out of their task categories and thus they are 
blocked under the access control policy. Attempt ④ 
is allowed if it is the “No –write-down” Policy of the 
BLP model and the “No-read-down” Policy of Biba 
model, but it is blocked under the policy of the CBB 
model suggested in this study. 
Authority Delegation (Security Key Delegation) 
Authority delegation can be executed only by 
subjects who have security keys to objects at certain 
levels. A subject who has access authority to certain data 
under the SoD principle is able to delegate the authority 
to unauthorized subjects at the same level (meaning 
sibling subjects in separately classified tasks) and other 
subjects at higher levels in other tasks. 
In delegating authority, the policies defined in 
“Complementary BLP and Biba policy” section should 
not be violated. If a subject receives a request to permit 
authority delegation from those at the same level or higher 
levels, the subject should delegate its security keys to 
them after checking whether there is any violation of the 
defined policies or not. The results of delegation, as data 
to identify relevant subjects, objects and delegated 
security keys, is sent to and saved at a repository for 
access control policies and utilized as data for review. 
Case Study 
This chapter shows an application cases by applying 
the proposed method to the Human Resources 
management System (HRMS). As a case study, the 
example case of handling confidential information due 
to the characteristics of the MAC model is desirable, 
but it is difficult because it includes sensitive data 
related to military agency. 
Human Resources Management System (HRMS) 
The suggested DSDC-MAC model was applied to a 
Human Resources Management System (HRMS) to verify 
its reliability. The HRMS handles sensitive personnel 
information such as social identification, contact number, 
passport information, HR history, work performance, 
annual salary, etc. Since such information needs to be 
classified by task areas and security levels, it is suitable to 
apply the DSDC-MAC model to this system. 
Figure 11 shows general task areas of the HRMS 
including employment management, HR operation/ 
management, absence control, performance evaluation 
management and payment management. Under the 5 
super-categories of tasks, sub-categories are classified 
respectively and further detailed data are also included. 
DSDC-MAC-based HRMS Access Control Model 
Domain Task Category and Security Leveling of 
HRMS 
First, tasks are separated and data security levels are 
determined. The areas of the separated tasks are defined 
based on the SoD classification in Table 2 (chapter 3) 
and the HRMS task categories in Fig. 11. In order to set 
security levels on data units in detail, data groups are 
included in the sub-category classification. Data security 
levels are set using the security levels in Table 1. The 
items shown in Table 9, except the subject and object 
columns, define task categories and security levels. For 
instance, “Candidate Information” is a sub-task of the 
super-category “Employment Management,” and “n1) 
Contact No.” in the Task and Data item under the sub-
category is the sub-data group of “Candidate 
Information.” The detailed data under the group is 
classified as “Confidential,” and thus only those in 
charge of the task are allowed to access the data. 
Soon-Book Lee et al. / Journal of Computer Science 2020, 16 (1): 72.91 
DOI: 10.3844/jcssp.2020.72.91 
 
86 
Separation of Duties by Subject and Object of HRMS 
Subjects and objects are linked to the HRMS task 
categories and data defined above as shown in Table 9. 
In particular, subjects are divided into worker and 
manager in charge of each task (department) and vice 
president or president who has higher responsibility. 
Generally, the higher work position, the higher 
responsibility. Persons at higher-level positions tend to 
have higher security levels. Thus, worker is given the 
3rd-grade security level (Confidential) and manager, the 
2nd-grade security level (Secret). More sensitive 
information is classified as the 1st-grade security level 
(Top secret) and president or vice president is given the 
security level. In particular, “n2) Social ID No.” in Table 
9 is very sensitive data and thus its security level is 
classified as “Top Secret” to ensure that the information 
is controlled by the highest-level manager. Subjects who 
can access the data are limited to “Vice President.” 
In other words, the data can be accessed only by 
subjects who are allowed to handle the “Personal 
Information” task which is one of the sub-category tasks 
of the super-category task, “Human Resources Operation 
Management,” and who at the same time have access 
authority to Top Secret. If necessary, data can be entered 
or altered by others through authority delegation. 
Data Coloring of HRMS Objects 
A data coloring technique is applied to the subjects 
and objects (Table 9) of the HRMS defined by tasks 
above and Table 10 shows the results. Security colors by 
security levels are mapped based on Rule 3 and Table 4 
and those by task categories are mapped based on Rule 4 
and Table 5. “Personal Information” is one of the sub-
tasks of the super-category “Human Resources 
Operation Management,” and “n3) Contact No.” in Table 
10 is one of the sub-data groups under Personal 
Information. The security level of the detailed data is set 
as “Confidential” to ensure that they can be accessed by 
only persons in charge of the task. Under Rules 3 and 4, 
identifiers (RGB color codes) are also given to the data 
using the data coloring technique. 
 
 
 
Fig. 11: HRMS task categories 
Employment management 
Human resources 
operation management 
Absence control 
Candidate info. 
management 
Personal info. 
management 
Absence result 
management 
Name 
Name Level result 
management 
Social ID no. 
Candidate no. Contact no. 
Performance evaluation 
management Address 
Contact no. 
Address 
Education level 
Name 
Work performance 
management 
Social ID no. 
Contact no. 
Address 
Career 
Evaluation level 
management 
Payment management 
Education level 
Employment result 
management 
Salary management 
Personal record 
management 
Promotion record 
management 
Education record 
management 
Annual salary 
management 
Severance pay 
management 
[Legend]                    Super category,                         Sub category,                      Data level 
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Table 9: Definition of the subjects and objects by HRMS task categories 
  Sub category 
Super category  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Task category Task Task Category Task and data Identifier Subject Object Security Level 
Task #1 Employment subTask #1_1 Candidate Info. t_1_10 Manager - - 
 Management Data #1 Name t_1_11 Worker Marco,  
  Data #2 Candidate No. t_1_12 Worker Lee Unclassified 
  Data #3 n1) Contact No. t_1_13 Worker C.101 Unclassified 
      010-205-0011 Confidential 
Task #2 Human resources subTask #2_1 Personal Info. t_2_10 Manager - - 
 operation management Data #1 Name t_2_11 Worker John,  
  Data #2 n2) Social ID No. t_2_12 Vice.President Song Unclassified 
  Data #3 Contact No. t_2_13 Worker 54602-14560 Top Secret 
      010-303-1100 Confidential 
: : : : : : : : 
 
Table 10: Applying data coloring to the subjects and objects of HRMS task categories 
Sub category 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Applying data coloring 
Task category Task Identifier Subject Object Security level (RGB Color code) 
subTask #1 Candidate Info. t_1_10 Manager - - - 
Data #1 Name t_1_11 Worker Marco, Lee Unclassified K 
Data #2 Candidate No. t_1_12 Worker C.101 Unclassified K 
Data #3 Contact No. t_1_13 Worker 010-205-0011 Confidential SC_B_t1_13 
            (#AA30FF) 
subTask #1 Personal Info. t_2_10 Manager - - - 
Data #1 Name t_2_11 Worker John, Song Unclassified K 
Data #2 Social ID No. t_2_12 Vice.President 54602-14560 Top Secret SC_R_t2_12 
      (#FFBB20) 
Data #3 n3) Contact No. t_2_13 Worker 010-303-1100 Confidential SC_B_t2_13 
            (#BB30FF) 
: : : : : : : 
* K: Black (Unclassified data) (Table 4) 
 
Table 11: Definition of security keys of subjects for accessing objects in HRMS 
Task Subject Security level Data coloring Security key 
Total managing CEO Top secret SC_R_t1+2+3+4+5 SK_R_t1+2+3+4+5 
 Vice CEO Top secret SC_R_t1+2+3+4+5 SK_R_t1+2+3+4+5 
Employment Employment manager Secret SC_G_t1 SK_G_t1 
management Employment office worker Confidential SC_B_t1 n4) SK_B_t1 
HRO management HRO manager Secret SC_G_t2 SK_G_t2 
 HRO office worker Confidential SC_B_t2 SK_B_t2 
 
Definition of Security Keys of Subjects for 
Accessing HRMS Objects 
Table 11 shows the HRMS security keys for each 
object to access objects and they are defined based on 
Table 7 and 8 and formulas 7~16 using data coloring and 
SoD. “n4) SK_B_t1” in Table 11 is defined as the 
security key that has access authority both to t1, the 
identifier of the supper-category task called 
“Employment Management,” and objects classified as 
the 3rd-grade security level (Confidential). This security 
key is granted only to users at the related security level 
in the same task category, that is, “Employment office 
worker.” Here, the security key is a means to identify 
subjects and objects when subjects try to access objects 
that they are allowed to do so. This can be also used as a 
tool to authorize subjects, allowing them to validly 
access to objects according to the defined rules. 
Authority-Based HRMS Policy Definition 
Based on the subject, object and security key defined 
above, access authority policies for the HRMS can be 
defined under Rules 5-7 as follows: 
 
S: SC_t1⇒O: ≚SC_t1{p} 
S: SC_R_t1⇒O: SC_R_t1{e, r, a, w},  
 O: SC_G_t1{e, r, a, w}, O: SC_B_t1{e, r, a, w} 
S: SC_G_t1⇒O: SC_G_t1{e, r, a, w},  
 O: SC_B_t1{e, r, a, w} 
S: SC_B_t1⇒O: SC_B_t1{e, r, a, w} 
S: ∧SC ⇒ O: SC_K{e, r, a, w} 
 
The policies above stipulate that subjects who have 
access authority to Task#1 (Employment Management) 
are allowed to access data below the security level. In 
other words, subjects who have the Red security level 
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(1st-grade/Top Secret) in Task#1 can access data 
classified as 1st, 2nd and 3rd grades as well as general-
level data within the relevant task category.  
Such access policies above define all the individual task 
categories and under task categories, subjects, objects and 
security keys are linked and defined accordingly. 
Evaluation 
 In this section, it focus the primary characteristics of 
the access control model, compare the proposed model 
with the legacy MAC models and discuss the 
characteristics and limitations of the proposed model. 
Discussion on the Access Control Policies with 
Case Study 
Looking at the HRMS case and access control 
policies of the DSDC-MAC model, the Employee 
manager with green authority of task classification t1 has 
authority to read and write about the 3nd grade data as 
well as 2nd grade of t1. However, T2's 2nd grade 
(Green) secrets, which can only be accessed by HRO 
Managers of the same class, are not accessible under the 
separation of duties policy. In addition, Employment 
office workers with t1 (blue) authority with the same 
task are not authorized to read, write, or access 2nd 
grade (Green) secrets. This indicates that a low level of 
confidentiality can improve the confidentiality and 
integrity by not being able to read or write higher level 
secrets. Moreover, even if a subject has the same level of 
authority, if the job is different, it can further ensure 
confidentiality and integrity so that it cannot be read or 
written. However, in case of legacy BLP and Biba 
model, there has problems as follows. If it is BLP model, 
Employment Office Worker of 3nd grade (Blue Level) 
cannot read “Green” Data of 2nd grade, but “Write” is 
possible, so there is integrity problem. In the Biba 
model, Employment office workers cannot "write" data 
of 2nd grade, but "read" is possible, which is a 
confidentiality problem. Furthermore, both models are 
capable of “write” and “read” at the same level, which 
makes it possible to read or modify secrets irrelevant to 
the job, which leads to problems of confidentiality and 
integrity. On the other hand, the proposed DSDC-MAC 
model can solve above problems. 
Comparative Evaluation with the Existing Methods 
The DSDC-MAC model is evaluated in comparison 
with other MAC models, including BLP, Biba and 
Lattice-based access control model as shown in Table 
12. The proposed model was compared with existing 
studies mainly from two aspects, including 
confidentiality/ integrity and model design.  
From the confidentiality and integrity aspect, more 
detailed classification on subjects and objects was 
required to support these features. Compared with earlier 
studies, it is basically possible to classify subjects and 
objects in detail according to security levels in the BLP, 
Biba and lattice-based models. Those models, however, 
failed to classify the items further as the proposed model 
in this study did by applying the SoD principle.  
Especially, coupled with the method of security 
keys, this model provides dual-lock access control tools 
unlike other models. For flexibility, the proposed 
model allows authorized users with security keys can 
delegate their authority to sibling subjects in other task 
categories and those at higher levels. Using the access 
control policy repository, the results of the requests and 
approvals for authority delegation can be used for 
review later afterwards. 
In addition, the BLP model emphasizes confidentiality 
and the Biba model emphasizes integrity respectively. 
Thus, these models did not meet confidentiality and 
integrity at the same time. On the other hand, the Lattice 
model has been shown to be mathematically acceptable 
within one Lattice to solve the limitations of the security 
policies of the BLP and Biba models. Therefore, the 
Lattice model appears to support both confidentiality and 
integrity simultaneously. 
 
Table 12: Evaluation with current MAC models  
  BLP model  Lattice model 
  (Bell and Biba model (Sandhu, 1993; Proposed  
Assessed items  LaPadula, 1975) (Biba, 1997) Denning, 1976) model 
Confidentiality Detailed classification method 
and integrity of subjects and objects △ △ △ ○ 
 Supporting SoD policy × × × ○ 
 Simultaneously supporting 
 confidentiality and integrity × × ○ ○ 
 Dual-lock access control × × × ○ 
 Supporting authority delegation  
 (Access control flexibility) × × × ○ 
 Supporting function to review task performance × × × △ 
Model design Offering identifiers of subjects and objects × × × ○ 
 Supporting strict authorization process × × × ○ 
 Secure key management × × × ○ 
 Offering case study or implementation model △ △ △ ○ 
[Legend] ○: applicable/supported, △: partially applicable/supported, ×: not applicable/supported 
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From the aspect of model design, no suggestion was 
found in earlier studies on identifiers of subjects and 
objects. In this study, however, accurate identifiers were 
presented using a data coloring technique. In addition, 
other studies have not supported strict authorization and 
secure key management. 
Furthermore, other legacy studies did not have 
specific case studies or implementation models and were 
only described as illustrative levels. However, this study 
presented a case study through HRMS system. 
Characteristics and Limitations 
The main features of the proposed DSDC-MAC 
model and policies are as follows:  
 
 SoD-driven access control 
While earlier studies use a vertical method for 
access control based on security levels (Top 
Secret/Secret/Confidential/Unclassified) only, 
access control can be further segmented horizontally 
even within the same security level based on tasks in 
the proposed model 
 Security color-focused access control 
The proposed model support identifiers of data by 
security levels and task categories using data 
coloring, providing object-oriented access control 
based on security colors 
 Mapping subjects and objects based on security keys 
The proposed model guarantees subjects dual-lock 
authorization tools using security keys. With 
security colors and keys, subjects and objects can be 
identified and their access can be controlled, thus 
supporting dual-lock security control 
 Complementary BLP and Biba (CBB) model policy 
By suggesting a new CBB policy model, the 
proposed model can address contra diction issues 
associated with confidentiality and integrity that are 
found in the BLP and Biba models. With this 
mechanism, security can be further improved 
 In addition to complementing confidentiality and 
integrity policies by Data Coloring and Separation 
of Duty, this study provides one of the contributions 
to provide dual-lock access control through Security 
Key. However, it did not examine in detail the 
implementation method of optimized security key 
and only mentioned that security key 
implementation such as OTP is possible. Thus, 
further follow-up studies are needed 
 
The followings are some potential limitations found 
in the proposed model: 
 
 The proposed model lacks standardized 
specifications on the security policies using SPL.  
(Access Control Language for Security Policy)  
 The proposed model has to be implemented or built 
in existing DBMS systems 
To implement the results of this study in real 
settings, it is essential to apply them in 
commercialized DBMS systems, but there is some 
difficulty in implementing it in reality. It was 
difficult to apply key modules suggested in this 
study to commercialized products such as Oracle 
and more time and efforts should be put into 
applying them to open source DBMS systems. More 
optimized methods to implement security keys in 
reality should be also suggested 
 
Conclusion 
This study suggested a DSDC-MAC model and 
security policies that can improve both the 
confidentiality and integrity of MAC models such as 
BLP and Biba using SoD and data coloring techniques. 
Based on the policies of the proposed model, tasks of 
subjects and objects were classified and security colors 
were given to each of the classified subjects according to 
their security levels. The colors were matched with 
security keys to prevent or allow subjects to access 
objects (or data). By applying the principle of SoD-based 
access control, ambiguity in access control within the 
same security level was removed. It was possible to 
segment security and access controls for subjects and 
objects using a data coloring technique. Collisions 
between security policies can be prevented by 
simultaneously supporting confidentiality and integrity 
based on MAC models. In addition, it becomes convenient 
to identify data security levels and manage access control 
by assigning security colors to individual task data. At 
the same time, it is possible to provide dual-lock access 
control along with security keys. The model can be 
applied to the design and construction of an organization's 
internal systems or organizations that deal with a lot of 
confidential information, such as the military or 
intelligence agencies that only provide specific 
information to specific personnel. In particular, it will be 
an effective countermeasure against insider threats.  
The Complementary BLP and Biba (CBB) security 
policies in the suggested model need to be further 
specified using an access control language in a follow-up 
study. The efficiency and usability of the proposed 
model should be analyzed further by applying it to 
settings such as object-oriented DB. Furthermore, it will 
be also necessary to implement a DBMS system 
equipped with the security structure of such databases. In 
addition, the present model has been studied to ensure 
confidentiality and integrity at the same time, but does 
not consider availability, one of the third triad of 
security. Therefore, in the system implementation stage 
applying the proposed model, it is necessary to conduct 
research so that a valid licensee has no restriction on 
service use in consideration of 'availability'. In addition, 
a study on both the implementation of the security key 
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optimized for the presented model and also the 
complexity analysis of the proposed approach method is 
required. Based on these future studies, a practical case 
study is needed to verify the applicability of the 
proposed model to specific institutions. 
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